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ENVIRONMENTAL TRADE MEASURES,
THE SHRIMP-TURTLE RULINGS,
AND THE ORDINARY MEANING OF THE
TEXT OF THE GATT
Howard F. Chang1
The World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body issued
the most important rulings to date on the status of
environmental trade measures under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)2 in its 1998 report3 and 2001 report4 in
the “shrimp-turtle” dispute. At issue in this case was section 609
of Public Law 101-162,5 a U.S. statute that the U.S. Court of
International Trade had interpreted as a ban on shrimp imports
from countries not certified by the United States as having
adopted “a regulatory program governing the incidental taking
of . . . sea turtles . . . that is comparable to that of the United
States.”6 The United States adopted such a program to promote
the conservation of sea turtles, which are endangered species.
This program includes a requirement that U.S. trawlers use
turtle excluder devices (TEDs) to protect sea turtles from
1 Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Copyright © 2005 by
Howard F. Chang. Parts of this article have appeared previously in a shorter essay by
Howard F. Chang, Toward a Greener GATT: Environmental Trade Measures and the
Shrimp-Turtle Case, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 31 (2000). I wish to thank Robert Howse and
participants at the Chapman University symposium, at a United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) seminar at Renmin University in Beijing, China, at the Association
of American Law Schools (AALS) Conference on Environmental Law in Portland, Oregon,
and at a symposium sponsored by the Association for Comparative Studies of Legal
Cultures in Tokyo, Japan, for their helpful comments.
2 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt. 5, 55 U.N.T.S.
187 [hereinafter GATT].
3 Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), 38 I.L.M. 118 (1999)
[hereinafter 1998 Appellate Body].
4 Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products; Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia,
WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001) [hereinafter 2001 Appellate Body].
5 Sea Turtle Conservation Amendments to the Endangered Species Act, Public Law
101-162, sec. 609, 103 Stat. 988, 1037 (Nov. 21, 1989) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1537 note
(1984)).
6 Id. sec. 609(b)(2)(A), 103 Stat. at 1038; see Earth Island Institute v. Christopher,
942 F. Supp. 597 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1996), vacated, Earth Island Inst. v. Albright, 147 F.3d
1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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incidental capture and drowning in shrimping nets. India,
Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand complained that the U.S. ban
on shrimp imports violated GATT Article XI,7 which prohibits
quantitative restrictions on imports, and requested that a WTO
panel settle their dispute with the United States.
Given the hostile attitude toward environmental trade
measures reflected in past panel decisions under the GATT, the
WTO Appellate Body’s 1998 ruling in the shrimp-turtle case
represented a significant step toward more liberal treatment of
these measures under the GATT. In stark contrast to the
consistent pattern in those past decisions, the Appellate Body
upheld the statute in dispute and objected only to very specific
aspects of its implementation. The Appellate Body endorsed the
general type of case-by-case review that I had proposed in my
writings and thereby brought GATT case law much closer to a
reasonable balance between environmental and trade interests.8
The 1998 Appellate Body decision, as I have noted in prior
writing about that ruling, suggests that countries can defend
unilateral import bans as permissible environmental measures
under the GATT as long as they avoid unfair discrimination.9
The result was a decision much more sensitive to environmental
interests than observers had expected.
To comply with the Appellate Body’s decision, the U.S. State
Department issued new guidelines in 1999 that addressed the
problems identified by the Appellate Body in its 1998 report.10
Malaysia nevertheless complained that the United States had
not brought its policies into conformity with the 1998 ruling.
Malaysia brought this complaint before the WTO, and in 2001,
the Appellate Body held that the United States had complied
with the 1998 Appellate Body decision, confirming that the U.S.
import ban was consistent with the GATT despite the ban’s
reliance on environmental standards unilaterally prescribed by
the United States.
The Appellate Body’s rulings in this dispute, however, have
generated some confusion regarding the standard that WTO
panels should apply to environmental trade measures in the
GATT, supra note 2, art. XI, 61 Stat. pt. 5, at A32, 55 U.N.T.S. at 224.
See generally Howard F. Chang, Carrots, Sticks, and International Externalities,
17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 309 (1997) [hereinafter Chang, International Externalities];
Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the Global
Environment, 83 GEO. L.J. 2131 (1995) [hereinafter Chang, Trade Measures].
9 See Chang, supra note 1. This article updates and expands upon the analysis that
I presented in that essay.
10 See Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of Section 609 of Public Law 101162 Relating to the Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 64
Fed. Reg. 36,946, 36,948 (1999).
7
8
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future. In this article, I will suggest that the 2001 ruling by the
Appellate Body confirms an interpretation of the 1998 shrimpturtle decision that preserves broad leeway for the use of
environmental trade measures.
I will argue that a more
restrictive interpretation of the shrimp-turtle rulings would be
inconsistent with the Appellate Body’s close attention to the
“ordinary meaning” of the text of the GATT in its legal reasoning.
First, in Part I of this article, I will review the Appellate
Body’s decisions in the shrimp-turtle cases, summarizing the
Appellate Body’s rulings in both its 1998 and 2001 reports.
Unlike
prior
dispute-settlement
reports
addressing
environmental trade measures under the GATT, the Appellate
Body in the shrimp-turtle cases emphasized the “ordinary
meaning” of the text of the GATT. This explicit focus on the
treaty text implies better legal reasoning and more liberal
treatment for environmental trade measures than we have seen
in the past. Second, in Part II, I consider three questions of
interpretation that have generated disagreements among readers
of the Appellate Body reports. With respect to each issue, I argue
that fidelity to the “ordinary meaning” of the text of the GATT
requires the interpretation of those reports that gives WTO
members greater freedom to use environmental trade measures.
I.

THE SHRIMP-TURTLE RULINGS

The United States defended its ban on shrimp imports as a
measure falling within GATT Article XX, which sets forth
general exceptions from the obligations set forth elsewhere in the
GATT. In particular, Article XX states:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement
by any contracting party of measures:
....
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
....
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption;
. . . .11

In May 1998, the WTO panel nevertheless ruled against the
11

GATT, supra note 2, art. XX, 61 Stat. pt. 5, at A60-61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
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United States.12
When the United States lost before the WTO panel in the
shrimp-turtle case, it was the third time in a row that a disputesettlement panel had held that the United States had violated
the GATT by banning imports harvested in a manner harmful to
marine life. Pursuant to the Marine Mammal Protection Act
(MMPA),13 the United States has banned imports of tuna from
countries that have not adopted programs to protect dolphins
comparable to the U.S. program. In 1991, and again in 1994,
dispute-settlement panels held that the MMPA violated the
GATT.14 Both those GATT panels, like the WTO panel in the
shrimp-turtle case, ruled against the United States on grounds so
general and sweeping that they left little scope for trade
measures to protect the global environment. The GATT Council,
however, adopted neither of the “tuna-dolphin” panel reports,
which therefore never became legally binding.
A.

The 1998 Appellate Body Ruling

In the shrimp-turtle case, the United States appealed the
panel’s ruling to the WTO Appellate Body, which in October 1998
also ruled against the United States, but on much narrower
grounds than the panel below. In its ruling, the Appellate Body
used much better legal reasoning than we have seen in past
panel decisions, with much closer attention to the ordinary
meaning of the language in GATT Article XX. For example, in
the shrimp-turtle case the panel below required that any
measure allowed under Article XX must not be “a type of
measure” that would “undermine the WTO multilateral trading
system” if adopted by others,15 a requirement that echoes a
concern expressed by both the 1991 and 1994 tuna-dolphin
panels.16 In a striking departure from the pattern established by
those past decisions, the Appellate Body explicitly rejects this
requirement as “a test that finds no basis . . . in the text” of
Article XX.17 The Appellate Body criticized the panel below for
failing to examine “the ordinary meaning of the words of Article

12 See Report of the Panel, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998), 37 I.L.M. 832 (1998) [hereinafter 1998
Panel].
13 Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421h (1994).
14 See Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT
Doc. DS29/R (May 20, 1994), 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Panel]; Report of the
Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. DS21/R (Aug. 16,
1991), GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993) [hereinafter 1991 Panel].
15 1998 Panel, supra note 12, para. 7.44.
16 See 1994 Panel, supra note 14, para. 5.26; 1991 Panel, supra note 14, para. 5.27.
17 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 121.
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XX.”18 The Appellate Body stressed that “[a] treaty interpreter
must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular
provision to be interpreted,” looking beyond that text only
“[w]here the meaning imparted by the text itself is equivocal or
inconclusive, or where confirmation of the correctness of the
reading of the text itself is desired.”19 Thus, as John Knox has
observed, the Appellate Body “decided that its starting point
would always be the ordinary meaning of the text” and that it
would “follow the ordinary meaning of the text before it as far as
possible.”20 This emphasis on the “ordinary meaning” of the
treaty text is itself significant, because each of the prior panel
decisions ruled against the United States based on requirements
that the panels invented without any support in the text of
Article XX.21 Critics of those past decisions, including this
author, have urged a more literal reading of Article XX, which
implies a broader reading of the Article XX exceptions.22
Turning to the question of whether section 609 is a measure
“relating to” conservation within the meaning of Article XX(g),
the Appellate Body in the shrimp-turtle case found the “general
design and structure” of section 609 to be “reasonably related” to
a “legitimate policy” of conservation.23 The Appellate Body noted
that section 609 “is not disproportionately wide in its scope and
reach in relation to the policy objective of protection and
conservation of sea turtle species.”24 The requirement that “a
country adopt a regulatory program requiring the use of TEDs,”
according to the Appellate Body, “is . . . directly connected with
the policy of conservation of sea turtles.”25 Thus, the Appellate
Body concluded that section 609 “is a measure ‘relating to’ the
conservation of an exhaustible natural resource within the
meaning of Article XX(g).”26
Id. para. 115.
Id. para. 114.
John H. Knox, The Judicial Resolution of Conflicts Between Trade and the
Environment, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 50 (2004).
21 See Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 8, at 2145; Carrie Wofford, Note, A
Greener Future at the WTO: The Refinement of WTO Jurisprudence on Environmental
Exceptions to GATT, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 563, 573 (2000) (“Through a more literal
interpretation of the text of Article XX, the Appellate Body has abandoned several
tests . . . that prior panels had imposed . . . that had no basis in the actual language of
Article XX.”).
22 See, e.g., Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 8, at 2172-75; Robert Howse, The
Turtles Panel: Another Environmental Disaster in Geneva, J. WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1998, at
73.
23 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 141.
24 Id.
25 Id. para. 140.
26 Id. para. 141. Some observers have read the Appellate Body’s analysis to suggest
a requirement of “proportionality,” so that a broader import ban might be
“disproportionately wide” and thus fail to qualify as a measure “relating to” conservation
18
19
20
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The Appellate Body carefully identified problems only in the
way in which the executive branch applied this law to countries
exporting shrimp. In particular, the Appellate Body held that
the executive branch applied section 609 “in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries,” which violates the
requirements set forth in the preamble, or “chapeau,” of Article
XX.27 Thus, the Appellate Body avoided the use of any general
per se rules against environmental trade measures like the
sweeping rules announced by panels in the past. Instead, the
Appellate Body endorsed a case-by-case analysis that relies on
the requirements explicit in the chapeau of Article XX to guard
against the abuse of the Article XX exceptions,28 much as critics
of past panel decisions, including this author, have proposed.29
Given its case-specific approach, the opinion is explicit regarding
precisely which particular features of the application of the trade
measure in question were “a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination.” Furthermore, each objection pertains to a
discriminatory aspect of the U.S. policy and is thus tied to the
actual text of Article XX:30
(1) First, although section 609 permits some flexibility in
determining whether an exporting country’s regulatory program
is “comparable” to the U.S. program, in practice U.S. officials
under Article XX(g). See Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle
Case: A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 491, 503 & n.33 (2002). Others have inferred that the Appellate Body may require a
“direct connection” between conservation and the measure in question. See Petros C.
Mavroidis, Trade and Environment after the Shrimp-Turtles Litigation, 34 J. WORLD
TRADE, Feb. 2000, at 73, 84-85. It would be inappropriate, however, to infer any
additional requirements stricter or more demanding than the modest requirement
actually set forth in the text of Article XX(g). While the Appellate Body praises certain
features of the section 609 import ban, it never states that these features are required by
Article XX(g). Given the ordinary meaning of the treaty language, “relating to”
conservation, the features praised are certainly sufficient but hardly necessary to show
that the measure satisfies that simple requirement. The Appellate Body does not present
its analysis as setting forth a new litmus test for measures “relating to” conservation.
Instead, the Appellate Body praises these features merely to underscore how easily
section 609 qualifies as a measure related to conservation.
27 GATT, supra note 2, art. XX, 61 Stat. pt. 5, at A60, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
28 See 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 159 (endorsing a balance that “moves
as the kind and the shape of the measures at stake vary and as the facts making up
specific cases differ”).
29 See, e.g., Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 8, at 2172-75; Steve Charnovitz, The
Environment vs. Trade Rules: Defogging the Debate, 23 ENVTL. L. 475, 513-15 (1993).
30 Although this attention to the text of Article XX represents an improvement over
past panel decisions, some critics complain that the Appellate Body distorted the meaning
of the term “discrimination.” See, e.g., Benjamin Simmons, Note, In Search of Balance:
An Analysis of the WTO Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
413, 445 (1999) (arguing that the Appellate Body “expanded the term ‘discrimination’ . . .
to encompass all of its criticisms of the U.S. measure, including criticisms that have no
relation to the plain meaning of ‘discrimination’”).
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only looked at whether the country’s policies are “essentially the
same” as U.S. policies.31 Officials did not take into account other
policies and measures that the country may have adopted, nor
did they consider different conditions that may exist in that other
country.32 Because this rigid approach to certification could
result in a ban on imports from a country with a different yet
comparable program, the Appellate Body held that this
inflexibility amounted to “arbitrary discrimination” among
countries with comparable programs in violation of the chapeau
of Article XX.33
(2) Second, the United States failed to engage in “serious”
negotiations with all affected countries before imposing its
import ban.34 The United States did negotiate with some
countries to produce the Inter-American Convention for the
Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles, concluded in 1996,
but not with other countries.35 The result was “unjustifiable”
discrimination.36
1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 163.
See id. para. 164.
Id. para. 177. For a critique of this interpretation of the phrase “arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination,” see Sanford Gaines, The WTO’s Reading of the GATT Article
XX Chapeau: A Disguised Restriction on Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L
ECON. L. 739, 784-90 (2001). See id. at 784 (arguing that the Appellate Body ruled
against the United States “because it refused to discriminate in trade treatment between
countries where different conditions may prevail,” which “is the exact converse of the
chapeau language”); Simmons, supra note 30, at 443 (arguing that “there is no affirmative
duty to discriminate where conditions between countries are different”). The Appellate
Body identified only the potential for discrimination among countries with equally
effective conservation programs; it did not find such discrimination in actual practice as a
matter of fact. Gaines argues that “[a]t the very least, the Appellate Body needed to make
a robust finding of fact that the shrimp fishing and sea turtle conditions in South Asian
waters were different from those in the Caribbean or western Atlantic in ways that were
significant for policies to reduce sea turtle mortality.”
Gaines, supra, at 786.
Furthermore, Gaines argues that the United States could justify any discrimination
resulting from an inflexible certification approach based on “considerations of
administrative capacity,” which militate in favor of a “simplified approach.” Id. at 788.
34 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 166.
35 See id. para. 171.
36 Id. para. 172. For a critique of this interpretation of the term “discrimination,” see
Gaines, supra note 33, at 805-07, 817-18. First, Gaines argues that we should read the
word “discrimination” in the Article XX chapeau to mean “only discrimination in trade.”
Id. at 807. Second, Gaines argues that any discrimination in negotiations caused
“absolutely no discrimination in trade,” id. at 806, because the “negotiations had no effect
on trade embargo decisions under Section 609,” id. at 817. Furthermore, Gaines
complains that the Appellate Body’s interpretation of the Article XX chapeau implies that
“the WTO sits in judgment of the wisdom of a member’s particular foreign policy
strategy.” Id. at 815. Lakshman Guruswamy argues that the Appellate Body’s holding
violates “the principle of state sovereignty by attempting to second-guess the manner in
which the United States should have conducted treaty negotiations,” because “States
possess the freedom to negotiate treaties as they deem proper” as “an essential attribute
of sovereignty that gives rise to the corollary duty of other States or international
organizations not to interfere with this power.” Lakshman Guruswamy, The Annihilation
of Sea Turtles: World Trade Organization Intrasigence and U.S. Equivocation, 30 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10,261, 10,267 (2000).
31
32
33
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(3) Third, the United States gave fourteen countries a threeyear phase-in period (1991-1994). The United States did not
impose an import ban on others until 1996, when it did so with
only four-months notice.37 The shorter phase-in period was not
only more burdensome but also accompanied by less effort by the
United States to transfer TED technology to the exporting
countries.38
The Appellate Body held that the foregoing problems in the
application of the statute “considered in their cumulative effect”
were “unjustifiable discrimination” in violation of Article XX.39
The phrase “in their cumulative effect” indicates that one of these
defects standing alone would not necessarily render the U.S.
policy inconsistent with the GATT. Thus, had the United States
discriminated among exporting countries only in terms of phasein periods or efforts to transfer technology, those discriminatory
practices standing alone might not amount to “unjustifiable
discrimination” within the meaning of Article XX.
(4) Finally, the Appellate Body complained that the U.S.
certification process was not “transparent”: that is, there is “no
formal opportunity for an applicant country to be heard, or to
respond to arguments . . . made against it,” “no formal written,
reasoned decision” with reasons for a denial of certification, and
“no procedure for review of, or appeal from, a denial.”40 Thus, the
United States denied certification without a process to ensure
that the statute is “applied in a fair and just manner.”41 The
Appellate Body concluded that denials under this procedure
amount to “arbitrary discrimination” against those countries
denied certification.42
See 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 174.
See id. para. 175.
Id. para. 176.
Id. para. 180. For an insightful analysis of the requirement of transparency, see
Patricia Isela Hansen, Transparency, Standards of Review, and the Use of Trade
Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 1017, 1057-67 (1999).
41 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 181.
42 Id. para. 184; see id. para. 181. For a critique of this interpretation of the term
“discrimination,” see Gaines, supra note 33, at 824-25. “Those who received certification
were, after all, subject to the same non-transparent process as the others. There is no
claim of discrimination in the procedures followed or decision criteria applied; the only
difference is the result.” Id. at 824; see Knox, supra note 20, at 58 (“[I]t is hard to see how
these procedures necessarily discriminated among applicant countries if . . . they were
applied to all countries equally.”). Although this process may have created the potential
for arbitrary discrimination among countries with equally effective conservation
programs, the Appellate Body did not find such discrimination in the administration of
the statute as a matter of fact. Gaines argues that “it was incumbent upon the Appellate
Body to establish that there was discrimination in practice, not merely the procedural
possibility” of “abusive discrimination.” Gaines, supra note 33, at 824; see Axel Bree,
Article XX GATT – Quo Vadis? The Environmental Exception After the Shrimp/Turtle
Appellate Body Report, 17 DICK. J. INT’L L. 99, 128 (1998) (“The existence of procedural
37
38
39
40
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B. The 2001 Appellate Body Ruling
To comply with the 1998 Appellate Body ruling in the
shrimp-turtle case, the United States began efforts to negotiate
with the four complainants in the case, seeking an agreement on
the conservation of sea turtles in the Indian Ocean region, as
well as efforts to provide technical assistance to those countries
to assist in the development of TED programs. The U.S. State
Department also issued new guidelines in 1999 to ensure
consideration of evidence that an exporting country’s program for
protecting sea turtles is comparable to the U.S. program in light
of different conditions or the use of methods other than TED
requirements and also to provide greater transparency and due
process for nations seeking certification under section 609.43
Malaysia nevertheless brought a complaint to the WTO claiming
that section 609 violated the GATT despite these U.S. efforts to
comply with the 1998 Appellate Body ruling. The WTO panel
reviewing U.S. implementation of that 1998 decision ruled in
favor of the United States in 2001,44 and Malaysia appealed to
the Appellate Body.
First, Malaysia argued that to avoid unjustifiable
discrimination, the United States had to conclude an
international agreement before imposing an import ban.45 The
Appellate Body rejected this suggestion, holding instead that the
United States must show “good faith efforts to reach
international agreements that are comparable from one forum of
negotiation to the other.”46 These “negotiations need not be
identical” or “lead to identical results.”47
Instead, “the
negotiations must be comparable in the sense that comparable
efforts are made, comparable resources are invested, and
comparable energies are devoted to securing an international
agreement.”48 The Appellate Body looked to the Inter-American
Convention for comparison and found the United States had
flaws . . . does not automatically indicate arbitrariness.”).
43 See Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of Section 609 of Public Law
101-162 Relating to the Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 64
Fed. Reg. 36,946 (July 8, 1999).
44 Report of the Panel, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/RW (June 15, 2001) [hereinafter 2001 Panel].
45 See 2001 Appellate Body, supra note 4, para. 115. Some commentators took a
similar view of the 1998 Appellate Body decision. See, e.g., Gary P. Sampson, Effective
Multilateral Environmental Agreements and Why the WTO Needs Them, 24 WORLD
ECONOMY 1109, 1126 (2001) (claiming that the Appellate Body “found that . . . the failure
to have established an environmental agreement . . . had resulted in unilateralism which
was discriminatory and unjustifiable”).
46 2001 Appellate Body, supra note 4, para. 122.
47 Id.
48 Id.
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made comparable efforts in the Indian Ocean region.49
Second, Malaysia argued that the U.S. import ban still
violated the GATT because it still required exporting countries to
meet standards “unilaterally” prescribed by the United States.50
The Appellate Body, however, found no problem with the United
States “conditioning market access on the adoption of a
programme comparable in effectiveness” to that adopted
unilaterally by the United States.51 To require “a programme
comparable in effectiveness” rather than “essentially the same
programme” allows “sufficient flexibility . . . so as to avoid
‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.’”52 By finally placing
its stamp of approval on a unilateral import ban, the Appellate
Body underscored how thoroughly it had rejected the reasoning
advanced in the past by the tuna-dolphin panels.
II. THE INTERPRETATION OF THE APPELLATE BODY RULINGS
Given the ease with which the United States brought its
unilateral import ban into compliance with the 1998 Appellate
Body ruling, without even amending section 609,53 one might
expect environmentalist critics of the tuna-dolphin decisions to
celebrate the dramatic changes in the interpretation of GATT
Article XX evident in the Appellate Body’s analysis. Some critics,
however, perceive little improvement in the prospects for
environmental trade measures under the GATT.
Sanford
Gaines, for example, argues that the 1998 Appellate Body ruling
“continues the tradition of trade jurisprudence that has almost
completely closed off the policy space Article XX should leave
open for national trade measures designed to protect the
environment.”54 The Appellate Body, he maintains, “gave little
ground for hope that the WTO will tolerate any real-world
unilateral use of trade leverage in furtherance of environmental
protection objectives reaching beyond national boundaries.”55
Gaines even claims that his “pessimistic assessment is confirmed
Id. para. 133.
Id. para. 135.
Id. para. 144.
Id.
To satisfy the Appellate Body regarding the flexibility of the U.S. certification criteria, for
example, the United States needed to make only minor changes in its guidelines for the implementation
of section 609. As Sanford Gaines notes, the United States only had to leave open “the possibility and
the process for an exporting country to rebut” the “presumption” in favor of the “same” regulatory
approach as that of the United States. Gaines, supra note 33, at 794. “That possibility was, in fact,
always there in the U.S. program. The revised guidelines simply state it more explicitly.” Id.
54 Gaines, supra note 33, at 773.
He complains that the Appellate Body’s
interpretation of the Article XX chapeau creates tests for non-discrimination that “become
a proverbial ‘eye of the needle’ through which hardly any national environmental
measures will be able to pass.” Id.
55 Id. at 743-44 (emphasis added).
49
50
51
52
53
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by the 2001 report of the WTO panel in the follow-on
proceeding,”56 despite the fact that the 2001 panel upheld the
section 609 import ban, an example of the type of “real-world
unilateral use of trade leverage” about which he worries. Even
the 2001 Appellate Body ruling, which “takes some of the hard
edges off the panel’s conclusions and . . . limits some of the
damage,” according to Gaines, “imposes extraordinary
preconditions on member governments before they resort to
Article XX for environmental measures.”57
While the shrimp-turtle rulings may well have imposed some
unwarranted “preconditions” on the use of environmental trade
measures, I will suggest that at least some of the concerns of
environmentalist critics derive from an unduly broad
interpretation of the “preconditions” set forth by the Appellate
Body. Ambiguities in the 1998 and 2001 Appellate Body reports
have generated disagreements among observers regarding the
correct interpretation of those decisions. In particular, I will
address three questions left open by those decisions and argue
that in each case, fidelity to the “ordinary meaning” of the text of
Article XX militates decisively in favor of the interpretation that
leaves greater scope for the use of environmental trade measures.
A.

The Jurisdiction of the Importing Country

The Appellate Body agreed that section 609 was a measure
“relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.”58
Therefore, the Appellate Body concluded that the statute came
within the exception in Article XX(g) despite the fact that section
609 called for a unilateral ban on imports based on the process by
which they were made or harvested outside the United States.
These types of attempts to influence production and process
methods (PPMs) outside the jurisdiction of the importing country
have been anathema to many in the GATT community, and some
have since expressed alarm that the Appellate Body decision
apparently allows the use of these process standards. Thailand,
for example, complained that the decision “will result in an
explosive growth in the number of environmental . . . measures
applied to PPMs and justified pursuant to Article XX.”59
Expressing similar concerns, the 1991 tuna-dolphin panel
ruled that the MMPA could not come within the Article XX
exceptions because it sought to protect dolphins from fishing
Id. at 744.
Id. at 745.
1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 145
Daniel Pruzin, WTO Formally Adopts Shrimp-Turtle Ruling as Thailand Fears
Victory May Be Pyrrhic, 15 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1884, 1885 (Nov. 11, 1998).
56
57
58
59
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fleets outside the jurisdiction of the United States.60 The
Appellate Body holding in the shrimp-turtle case rejects that
particular jurisdictional requirement, so it does not rule against
the U.S. import ban because it seeks to protect sea turtles from
activities outside U.S. jurisdiction. The opinion, however, leaves
open the question of whether there may be some jurisdictional
limitation implicit in Article XX(g):
We do not pass upon the question of whether there is an implied
jurisdictional limitation in Article XX(g), and if so, the nature or
extent of that limitation.
We note only that in the specific
circumstances of the case before us, there is a sufficient nexus
between the migratory and endangered marine populations involved
and the United States for purposes of Article XX(g).61

The opinion hints that it might be relevant that sea turtles
migrate through U.S. territory, and consequently several
commentators have suggested that such a nexus may be
necessary to justify an environmental trade measure under
Article XX(g).62
The Appellate Body, however, expressly declines to rule on
whether such a nexus is actually required, and the reasoning in
the opinion militates against any such jurisdictional
requirement. Such a requirement would be inconsistent with the
Appellate Body’s emphasis on the ordinary meaning of the text of
Article XX. In fact, the 1994 tuna-dolphin panel explicitly
rejected any limitation on the scope of the Article XX(g) exception
based on the location of the natural resources protected by the
trade measure in question, because the panel found no such
limitation in the text of Article XX(g).63 In the future, WTO
dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body should
similarly reject any such jurisdictional requirement as a test
with absolutely no basis in the text of Article XX.64
See 1991 Panel, supra note 14, paras. 5.25, .32, at 198, 200-01.
See 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 133.
See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 40, at 1057 (“States may permissibly use trade
measures to protect resources outside their territorial jurisdiction so long as . . . the state
has a sufficient ‘nexus’ with those resources . . . .”); Nancy L. Perkins, Introductory Note,
World Trade Organization: United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, 38 I.L.M. 118, 119 (1999) (suggesting that states may use trade
measures to protect environmental resources in the global commons “so long as there is at
least some jurisdictional relationship between those resources and that WTO Member”);
Asif H. Qureshi, Extraterritorial Shrimps, NGOs and the WTO Appellate Body, 48 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 199, 204 (1999) (reading the Appellate Body opinion as “stipulating the need
for a nexus between the State and the object of environmental concern”); Simmons, supra
note 30, at 440 (“[I]t remains unclear whether future panels will allow countries to
implement measures protecting natural resources outside their jurisdiction.”); Wofford,
supra note 21, at 584 (suggesting that “a nation may still need to prove that its territory
is affected by the environmental concern” to clear “the hurdle of jurisdiction”).
63 See 1994 Panel, supra note 14, paras. 5.15, .20.
64 Robert Howse suggests that “[t]he question . . . of whether there is an implicit
60
61
62
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As I have argued elsewhere, restrictions on imports produced
by environmentally harmful processes may protect important
resources wholly outside the jurisdiction of the importing
country.65 Some countries may regulate their own fishing fleets
to ensure that they provide optimal protection for marine
resources, but as long as these regulations raise costs for the
regulated producers and reduce their output, then these
countries must also support these regulations with trade
measures against imports harvested using harmful practices.
Otherwise, these imports would displace sales of domestic
products harvested subject to environmental regulation.
Furthermore, fishing operations may move to unregulated
countries in order to avoid these environmental regulations. In
the extreme, if imports displace sales by domestic producers
entirely, then countries that regulate succeed only in destroying
their domestic fishing industry without protecting the
environment.
By not only regulating the domestic fishing industry but also
shielding it against those foreign competitors that use practices
that harm the environment, a country can ensure that its efforts
to change the practices of its own producers will not be in vain.
Moreover, these trade measures protect the environment by
inducing foreign fishing fleets to reform their practices in order
to gain access to regulated markets. Through these effects on
both domestic and foreign fishing fleets, the application of a
process standard to imports contributes to the protection of the
global environment.
B.

The Environmental Policies of the Exporting Country

In the shrimp-turtle case, however, the United States
banned shrimp imports based not only on the processes used to
harvest the particular shipment of shrimp in question but also on
the environmental policies of the exporting country. Therefore,
the panel below ruled against the United States because it was
“conditioning access to its market . . . upon the adoption . . . of
territorial or jurisdictional limitation . . . may . . . be largely moot,” because “Article XX(g)
by its explicit language only applies to environmental trade measures that are coupled
with domestic environmental regulation.”
Howse, supra note 26, at 504.
The
requirement in Article XX(g) that conservation measures be “made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption,” however, does not
render the question of territorial jurisdiction moot. Suppose, for example, the United
States were to ban imports in an effort to protect an endangered marine species wholly
outside U.S. territory. A complainant could raise the question of a jurisdictional
requirement even if the United States were to make that import ban effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic producers that threaten the species through
their operations outside U.S. territory.
65 See Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 8, at 2177-78.
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certain policies” by the exporting country’s government.66 The
Appellate Body, however, explicitly and emphatically rejected
this rationale as an “error in legal interpretation” with “no
basis . . . in the text” of Article XX.67 Indeed, in paragraph 121 of
its report, the Appellate Body even went so far as to declare that
import bans based on whether the governments of exporting
countries have adopted policies “unilaterally prescribed” by the
importing country will be “a common aspect” of Article XX
measures.68 In the same remarkable paragraph, the Appellate
Body concluded that to consider such unilateral import bans “a
priori incapable of justification” under Article XX would be
“abhorrent to the principles of interpretation we are bound to
apply,” because it would render “most, if not all, of the specific
exceptions of Article XX inutile.”69
Thus, the Appellate Body held that countries may
unilaterally ban imports based not only on the process used in
producing the particular units in question but also on the
environmental policies of the targeted countries. In support of its
2001 complaint, Malaysia argued that paragraph 121 of the 1998
Appellate Body ruling was mere dicta, but the Appellate Body
firmly and emphatically rejected this suggestion in its 2001
ruling.70 In case there remained any doubt regarding the
significance of paragraph 121 of the 1998 ruling, the Appellate
Body quotes that paragraph at length and proclaims that it
“expresses a principle that was central to our ruling” in the
shrimp-turtle case.71 Thus, the Appellate Body leaves no doubt
that GATT Article XX allows countries to impose a unilateral
import ban broader than a mere process standard.
The 1994 tuna-dolphin panel cited the country-wide breadth
of the import ban imposed by the MMPA as the reason that it
ruled against the United States. The 1994 panel inferred that
the United States banned tuna imports “so as to force other
countries to change their policies” and held explicitly that those
import bans therefore fell outside Article XX.72 The Appellate
Body made a similar inference regarding the purpose of the U.S.
ban on shrimp imports, but did not hold that the U.S. measure

1998 Panel, supra note 12, para. 7.45.
1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, paras. 121-122.
Id. para. 121.
Id.
2001 Appellate Body, supra note 4, para. 138 (“Contrary to what Malaysia
suggests, this statement is not ‘dicta.’”).
71 Id.; see id. para. 137 (quoting 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 121, at
length and adding emphasis).
72 1994 Panel, supra note 14, para. 5.27.
66
67
68
69
70
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therefore falls outside Article XX.73 On the contrary, the
Appellate Body instead declared that “a requirement that a
country adopt a regulatory program requiring the use of TEDs” is
“directly connected with the policy of conservation of sea
turtles.”74 Thus, consistent with the ordinary meaning of the text
of Article XX, the Appellate Body’s opinion permits import bans
designed to change the policies of other governments. In fact, the
Appellate Body does not rule out the possibility that even trade
sanctions imposed with respect to products completely unrelated
to the marine resource in question may fall within Article XX if
they are intended to induce other countries to improve their
efforts at conservation of that resource.75
Importing countries can promote important environmental
objectives by requiring exporting countries to improve their
conservation efforts as a condition for access to domestic market
of the importing country.76 When process standards alone are
not effective in promoting more environmentally sound practices
or policies, broader import bans are often useful in inducing other
countries to join multilateral agreements and to comply with
them.77 Other countries who harm the environment must have
some reason to come to the negotiating table and to sign an
agreement, especially given the powerful economic incentives for
them to “free ride” on the restraint exercised by the countries
that do agree to regulate.78 The types of trade measures
condemned by past panels can create the incentives necessary for
countries to join a multilateral agreement that imposes

73 See Bruce Neuling, The Shrimp-Turtle Case: Implications for Article XX of GATT
and the Trade and Environment Debate, 22 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 45 (1999)
(noting that the Appellate Body “implicitly rejected” the reasoning of the 1994 panel).
74 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 140; see Susan L. Sakmar, Free Trade
and Sea Turtles: The International and Domestic Implications of the Shrimp-Turtles Case,
10 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 345, 345 (1999) (concluding that a WTO member may
“impose its domestic environmental regulations on another member so long as certain
safeguards are met”).
75 For a defense of such trade sanctions, see Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 8, at
2199-207.
76 For a comprehensive study of the role of import bans in promoting dolphin
conservation, see Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the
Global Commons: What We Can Learn From the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. INT’L
ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1999).
77 Broader import bans may also discourage environmentally harmful production
processes more effectively than process standards, even without changing the
environmental policies of foreign governments, because broader import bans make it even
more difficult for the producers using those harmful processes to find markets where they
can sell their products at a profit. See Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 8, at 2178-84.
78 We can reward countries that regulate with “carrots,” or we can threaten the use
of “sticks” against those who do not. The prospect of “carrots,” however, would create
perverse incentives to harm the environment. See Chang, International Externalities,
supra note 8; Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 8, at 2150-60.
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environmental regulations on them.79
Despite the Appellate Body’s endorsement of country-based
import bans in paragraph 121 of its 1998 ruling, the shrimpturtle litigation has left some doubts regarding the permissible
scope of these import bans. The 1998 Appellate Body opinion
acknowledges explicitly that while the dispute was before the
panel and the Appellate Body, the United States excluded even
shrimp caught using TEDs if the shrimp came from countries not
certified by the United States, and the Appellate Body expresses
some concern about this ban in paragraph 165 of its opinion,
suggesting that “[t]he resulting situation is difficult to reconcile
with the declared policy objective of protecting and conserving
sea turtles.”80 Some observers have concluded that the U.S.
import ban violated the GATT because it applied even to imports
that themselves were harvested by environmentally friendly
processes.
The question has been moot since 1998, when the U.S. State
Department adopted a policy allowing shrimp imports if the
individual shipment was caught with the use of TEDs, after the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated on
procedural grounds an earlier decision by the U.S. Court of
International Trade that had prohibited such imports.81 The
State Department issued final guidelines in 1999 that affirmed
Environmentalists
this “shipment-by-shipment exception.”82
continued to advocate a “country-by-country” import ban,
however, arguing that a “shipment-by-shipment” approach would
be ineffective in protecting sea turtles,83 and the U.S. Court of
79 See Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 8, at 2146-60. There are, of course,
devices other than trade measures that can induce the cooperation of foreign
governments, and a GATT prohibition on import bans would not render the use of other
sanctions illegal. Nevertheless, many of these other sanctions may sacrifice other
important interests or often have little effect on the governments of particular countries.
Because other sanctions on behalf of the environment may be costly or ineffective, trade
restrictions have proven particularly useful instruments in protecting environmental
interests. See id. at 2149; Chang, International Externalities, supra note 8, at 323-24.
80 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 165.
81 See Revised Notice of Guidelines for Determining Comparability of Foreign
Programs for the Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 63 Fed.
Reg. 46,094, 46,094-95 (1998); Earth Island Inst. v. Albright, 147 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir.
1998), vacating Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 942 F. Supp. 597 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1996).
82 Rossella Brevetti, State Department Issues Guidelines to Comply with WTO
Shrimp Ban Ruling, 16 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1183 (July 14, 1999).
83 Rossella Brevetti, USTR to Consult with Interested Parties on How to Respond to
Shrimp Ruling, 15 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1768, 1768-69 (Oct. 21, 1998). Critics of the
shipment-by-shipment approach complain that it undermines “the incentive to create a
national program” and encourages “countries with existing national programs to abandon
their all-encompassing programs.” Jennifer A. Bernaz, Note, The Eagle, the Turtle, the
Shrimp and the WTO: Implications for the Future of Environmental Trade Measures, 15
CONN. J. INT’L L. 207, 229 (2000).

CHANG FINAL

41

6/18/2005 1:48 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 8:25

International Trade ruled in favor of environmentalist plaintiffs
again in 2000, holding that section 609 permits the importation
of wild shrimp only from certified nations.84 Malaysia claimed in
its 2001 complaint that this ruling put the United States out of
compliance with the GATT as interpreted by the 1998 Appellate
Body decision, but both the panel and the Appellate Body
rejected Malaysia’s claim because the Court of International
Trade did not issue an injunction pending appeal, so that the
shipment-by-shipment exception continued to allow imports
caught using TEDs.85 Thus, Malaysia did not prevail with this
claim, but the Appellate Body’s basis for rejecting this claim in
2001 leaves open the substantive question of whether a countrybased import ban would violate the GATT in the absence of a
shipment-by-shipment exception.
Some commentators agree with Malaysia’s reading of the
1998 Appellate Body ruling on this issue. Eric Richards and
Martin McCrory, for example, claimed that by ruling against the
shipment-by-shipment exception, the Court of International
Trade could “sabotage United States compliance efforts.”86 They
interpret the shrimp-turtle ruling to imply that the use of “trade
leverage to force similar regulations on . . . trading partners”
would “run afoul of GATT rules.”87 To support this claim, they
quote passages in paragraph 161 of the 1998 ruling stating that
“[p]erhaps the most conspicuous flaw” in the “application” of
section 609 “relates to its intended and actual coercive effect on
the specific policy decisions made by foreign governments.”88
Adopting a similar view of this language from the 1998 ruling,
Sanford Gaines complains that “[b]y disqualifying . . . any
measure that has the result of applying the economic pressure of
84 See Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Mallett, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2000). The Federal Circuit would later overturn this decision on appeal in 2002
and uphold the shipment-by-shipment exception. See Turtle Island Restoration Network
v. Evans, 284 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc denied, 299 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1748 (2003).
85 2001 Appellate Body, supra note 4, para. 151 (holding that “the Panel took into
account the status of municipal law at the time, and reached the correct conclusion”).
86 Eric L. Richards & Martin A. McCrory, The Sea Turtle Dispute: Implications for
Sovereignty, the Environment, and International Trade Law, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 295, 325
(2000).
87 Id. at 333; see Brooks Ware, Staying Out of the Grasp of the GATT: Attempts to
Protect Animals at the Expense of Free Trade, CURRENTS, Winter 1998, at 69, 73 (“Section
609 ran afoul of Article XX because the U.S. had been excluding shrimp caught with
TEDs simply because the country where the shrimp were caught had not been ‘certified’
by section 609.”).
88 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 161; see Richards & McCrory, supra note
86, at 321. As a result of these passages, some observers consider the legality of a
country-by-country import ban “not so clear.” Rosella Brevetti, U.S. Examining Ways to
Make Restrictions on Shrimp Imports More Transparent, 16 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 309,
310 (Feb. 24, 1999) (quoting one source as stating that the Appellate Body’s decision “is
kind of grey” on this issue).
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a trade restriction on other governments unless they change
their resource conservation policies, the Appellate Body
effectively nullified Article XX(g).”89 Sydney Cone also infers
that the Appellate Body deemed a country-by-country import ban
to be a violation of the GATT.90 Therefore, Cone criticizes the
Appellate Body, which he believes “seems to have lost sight of its
own statement . . . that there is a reasonable relationship
between the US rules . . . ‘and the legitimate policy of conserving
an . . . endangered species.’”91
If we read the Appellate Body’s 1998 decision as criticizing
the United States for imposing a country-by-country ban, then
this criticism would indeed be inconsistent with earlier passages
in the same opinion, including paragraph 121, which the
Appellate Body would later emphasize so forcefully in 2001.92 If
we read each of the Appellate Body’s critical sentences carefully
in context, however, we find that each sentence is followed
immediately by an explanation that makes clear that the 1998
ruling did not object to a country-by-country import ban per se.
Instead, the Appellate Body’s specific complaint in paragraph
165 is that the United States applies this import ban to induce
other countries to adopt “essentially the same comprehensive
regulatory regime as that applied by the United States to its
domestic shrimp trawlers” even though many of these countries
“may be differently situated,” and the Appellate Body objects to
the import ban on these narrower grounds instead.93 Similarly,
89 Gaines, supra note 33, at 804; see Bree, supra note 42, at 122 (“[I]t remains
questionable whether the underlying rationale of pushing other countries to adopt policies
is permissible.”).
90 See Sydney M. Cone, III, The Appellate Body, the Protection of Sea Turtles and the
Technique of “Completing the Analysis,” J. WORLD TRADE, Apr. 1999, at 51, 53, 55, 58.
91 Id. (quoting Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 141). Cone complains that “the
Appellate Body ignored the difficult question of whether vessel-specific (as opposed to
country-by-country) enforcement of the US regulations would be too limited” to protect
sea turtles. Id. at 58; see Bree, supra note 42, at 122-23 (“Case by case decisions about the
import of particular shrimps depending on . . . how they are fished are not verifiable and
enforceable, and thus would lead to the failure of the conservation objective . . . .”);
Neuling, supra note 73, at 47 (complaining that “the suggestion that the U.S. Government
should not exclude shrimp caught with TEDs” will limit “the ability of the U.S.
Government to influence environmental practices abroad” and that “any system relying
on shipment-by-shipment inspections . . . would be vulnerable to fraud”).
92 See Howse, supra note 26, at 513 (“To say that the chapeau requires shipment-byshipment inspection . . . would be to interpret the chapeau in a manner that is
inconsistent with the [Appellate Body’s] overall understanding of the structure and
purpose of Article XX, as articulated in paragraph 121 of its original ruling, and
reaffirmed with emphasis in paragraph 138 of its [2001] ruling.”).
93 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 165 (noting that “shrimp caught using
methods identical to those employed in the United States have been excluded from the
United States market solely because they have been caught in waters of countries that
have not been certified by the United States” and concluding from this fact that “this
measure, in its application, is more concerned with effectively influencing WTO Members
to adopt essentially the same comprehensive regulatory regime as that applied by the
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this inflexibility is the particular aspect of the “coercive effect” of
the section 609 import ban that disturbs the Appellate Body in
paragraph 161.94
Thus, at most, the absence of a shipment-by-shipment
exception is merely an aggravating circumstance that contributes
to the “arbitrary and unjustifiable” nature of the discrimination
that may result from an inflexible certification process.95 That is,
the absence of such an exception is not itself a violation of any
requirement in Article XX. Observers have drawn a contrary
conclusion only by taking isolated statements from the 1998
Appellate Body ruling out of context.96
The Appellate Body has never claimed that Article XX
requires a shipment-by-shipment exception.97 The Appellate
Body made no such claim, for the simple reason that such a claim
would have no plausible basis in the ordinary meaning of the text
of Article XX. The Appellate Body could not derive such a claim
from its analysis of the Article XX chapeau, for example, without
distorting the ordinary meaning of the phrase “arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail.”98 While a country-by-country import ban
United States”); see supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
94 See id. para. 161 (criticizing the embargo for requiring other countries “to adopt
essentially the same policy . . . as that applied to . . . United States domestic shrimp
trawlers”). Thus, as Gaines recognizes, “[t]wo intertwined thoughts” prompted the
Appellate Body’s conclusion that the U.S. import ban had a “coercive effect” that
produced “unjustifiable discrimination.” Gaines, supra note 33, at 791. Both the rigid
application of the certification criteria, requiring policies identical to those of the United
States, and the use of trade measures to induce other governments to comply with those
criteria combined to produce “unjustifiable discrimination.” Id.
95 The 2001 panel addressed the shipment-by-shipment exception as if it were a
separate requirement distinct from the requirement of greater flexibility in the
certification criteria applied to exporting countries by the United States. See 2001 Panel,
supra note 44, para. 5.106. Robert Howse suggests that the United States did not appeal
this aspect of the 2001 panel’s interpretation of the 1998 Appellate Body ruling because
the executive branch of the U.S. government found that interpretation useful in defending
the shipment-by-shipment exception in federal court. See Howse, supra note 26, at 512.
96 See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 507, 511 (1999). Shaffer quotes paragraph 165 as
identifying the absence of a shipment-by-shipment exception as a second flaw in the U.S.
import ban, separate from the first flaw, which was the application of inflexible criteria
requiring exporting countries “to adopt essentially the same policy” as that adopted by the
United States. Id. His quote from paragraph 165, however, omits the language in that
paragraph identifying the inflexibility of the U.S. criteria, which required “essentially the
same” conservation policies as those adopted by the United States, as the fundamental
problem. 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 165. This omitted language makes
clear that the objection raised in paragraph 165 is merely an elaboration of the flaw of
inflexibility identified in the preceding paragraphs, not a separate independent flaw.
97 See Howse, supra note 26, at 512 (noting that “shipment-by-shipment inspection
was not presented as a separate requirement implicit in the chapeau” in the 1998
Appellate Body ruling, nor does it appear “as a separate sine qua non requirement” in the
2001 Appellate Body ruling).
98 GATT, supra note 2, art. XX, 61 Stat. pt. 5, at A60-61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
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without a shipment-by-shipment exception might discriminate
between producers harvesting shrimp using similar processes,
this discrimination does not entail any discrimination between
countries “where the same conditions prevail.”99
The only aspect of the substantive criteria used by the
United States to ban imports that the Appellate Body could
plausibly describe as “a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail” was the inflexibility of the U.S. certification criteria,
which raised the possibility of discrimination between countries
with comparably effective conservation policies. Once the United
States eliminated this inflexibility, those criteria were no longer
a means of any discrimination that the WTO could condemn
under the Article XX chapeau. Therefore, the United States can
apply a country-by-country import ban as long as it allows an
exporting country to argue that it is “differently situated” so that
its program for the protection of sea turtles may be certified as
“comparable” to that of the United States.100 Thus, the United
States would be in compliance with the GATT even if it were to
return to a country-by-country import ban under section 609,
because it has already revised its guidelines to allow for this
more flexible approach to certification.
C.

Unilateral Measures Without Multilateral Negotiations

The Appellate Body’s critique of the U.S. implementation of
section 609 has also generated some commentary suggesting that
“it is generally not acceptable for one WTO Member to restrict
trade based on the failure of other Members to conform their
natural resource conservation . . . policies to the unilateral
dictates of that WTO Member.”101 Richards and McCrory, for
example, assert that it is “permissible for a country to adopt
99 As the Appellate Body itself implied in its 1998 ruling, either “the same
conditions” do not prevail between countries with conservation policies that are not
comparably effective or discrimination between such countries is generally not “arbitrary
or unjustifiable.” To hold otherwise, according to paragraph 121 of that ruling, would be
“abhorrent,” because it would render “most, if not all, of the specific exceptions of Article
XX inutile.” 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 121.
100 See Joseph Robert Berger, Note, Unilateral Trade Measures to Conserve the
World’s Living Resources: An Environmental Breakthrough for the GATT in the WTO Sea
Turtle Case, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 355, 376 (1999) (noting that “[t]he WTO focused on
the combination of the nationwide approach with the imposition of an inflexible,
comprehensive regulatory program on all targeted nations” and suggesting that “[i]f the
United States can address the latter problem,” then “the nationwide embargo approach
might be accepted”) (emphasis added). Peter Fugazzotto of the Earth Island Institute has
expressed the view that the shipment-by-shipment approach is not necessary for
compliance with the Appellate Body ruling, but he concedes that “[w]hether the Asian
nations agree with that remains to be seen.” Brevetti, supra note 88, at 310.
101 Perkins, supra note 62, at 119.
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unilateral measures” only “in rare circumstances.”102 They cite
the discussion in the 1998 Appellate Body report of the general
preference for multilateral solutions to international
environmental problems over unilateral actions.103 In paragraph
171 of that report, for example, the Appellate Body points to the
Inter-American Convention as evidence that “an alternative
course of action” featuring “cooperative efforts” rather than “the
unilateral and non-consensual procedures of the import
prohibition” under section 609 “was reasonably open to the
United States.”104
On the other hand, the Appellate Body’s 1998 opinion
carefully avoids the suggestion that unilateral measures
generally fall outside Article XX. Such a claim would be
inconsistent with passages in paragraph 121 of the same opinion
implying that such a rule would render “most, if not all, of the
specific exceptions of Article XX inutile” and thus would be
“abhorrent.”105 Such a claim would also be inconsistent with the
use of the singular noun in Article XX, which permits “any
contracting party” to adopt the measures in question, and with
GATT case law, which has often found unilateral measures to fall
within Article XX.106 Nothing in the language of Article XX
suggests that unilateral measures are illegal if they are directed
at resources outside the jurisdiction of the importing country.
Opposing views of the Appellate Body’s 1998 ruling have
produced opposing views of the Appellate Body’s 2001 ruling,
which required the United States “to make good faith efforts to
reach international agreements that are comparable from one
forum of negotiation to the other.”107 Robert Howse reads this
statement to require the United States only “to negotiate
Richards & McCrory, supra note 86, at 340-41.
See id. at 322 (quoting 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, paras. 168, 171).
Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 171; see Arthur E. Appleton, Shrimp/Turtle:
Untangling the Nets, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 477, 493 (1999) (concluding that the “need for a
co-operative as opposed to a unilateral approach is among the central points of the
Appellate Body’s finding that the US measure constituted unjustifiable discrimination”);
Bree, supra note 42, at 125 (concluding that “unilateral measures are not permissible”).
Thus, Charles Arden-Clarke of the World Wide Fund for Nature International complained
that the Appellate Body ruling “still prevents countries from taking unilateral action on
the global commons when irreversible environmental damage takes place.” WTO Appeals
Body Faults Implementation of Shrimp-Turtle Law, 15 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1698, 1699
(Oct. 14, 1998).
105 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 121; see Sakmar, supra note 74, at 383 (noting
that “the WTO Appellate Body . . . recognized that unilateral measures aimed at
protecting the environment could be valid,” because “if such measures were not valid, the
exceptions found in Article XX would be superfluous”); Wofford, supra note 21, at 581
(“[T]he Appellate Body asserted that unilateral environmental policies are not only
legitimate, but also to be expected under Article XX exceptions.”).
106 GATT, supra note 2, art. XX, 61 Stat. pt. 5, at A61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
107 2001 Appellate Body, supra note 4, para. 122.
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104
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seriously with the complainants exactly to the extent it had
already negotiated with the western hemisphere countries, no
more and no less.”108 That is, the Appellate Body does not impose
“a self-standing duty to negotiate” independent of the duty not to
discriminate in these efforts.109 “The ‘unjustified discrimination’
was not the failure to negotiate as such, but the failure to treat
the complainants as well as . . . the western hemisphere
countries.”110 Thus, had the United States “negotiated with no
one, it would not have run afoul of the chapeau.”111
John Knox, however, reads the same statement from the
2001 ruling to express two separate requirements: “(1) to make
good faith efforts to negotiate international agreements; and (2)
to make sure that the efforts are comparable across the board.”112
That is, the Article XX chapeau required the United States to
negotiate with the 1998 complainants not only to avoid
discrimination against them but also to pursue the “multilateral
‘alternative course of action’” urged in paragraph 171 of the 1998
Appellate Body ruling.113 Based on a similar reading of the
Appellate Body rulings, Gaines worries that “unilateral measures
affecting transnational or global resources outside the context of
any systematic effort to promote a multilateral solution will, ipso
facto, not qualify under Article XX.”114
Furthermore, Gaines complains, the Appellate Body has left
open the “problematic” question of what “efforts, resources, and
Howse, supra note 26, at 508.
Id.
Id. at 508-09.
Id. at 509 n.39.
Knox, supra note 20, at 41 n.165.
Id. at 42 n.165; see Bree, supra note 42, at 123 (concluding that the 1998 Appellate
Body decision “required serious negotiations before taking unilateral action as a last
resort”). Knox claims that the 2001 panel took a similar view of the 1998 Appellate Body
ruling. See Knox, supra note 20, at 41 n.165 (citing 2001 Panel, supra note 44, paras.
5.59, .74, .76.). Gaines agrees, noting that the 2001 Appellate Body report “does not
specifically comment on, much less disavow, the panel’s extreme interpretation of the
‘requirement’ for prior effort at multilateral solutions before invoking Article XX rights.”
Gaines, supra note 33, at 818-19. Knox infers from the Appellate Body’s silence that it
agrees with the 2001 panel’s reading of the 1998 Appellate Body ruling. Knox, supra note
20, at 41 n.165 (“If Howse were right, surely the Appellate Body would have corrected the
panel’s basic mischaracterization of its earlier decision.”). The 2001 panel decision,
however, is not much clearer than the 1998 Appellate Body ruling on this question. Both
decisions impose a duty to negotiate upon the United States, but neither makes clear
whether this duty arises only because the United States had already negotiated with
some countries or because such a duty exists even in the absence of any discrimination
among exporting countries. In any event, the 2001 Appellate Body report, as Gaines
reads it, “shifts the emphasis away from ‘prior’ recourse to a more mundane concern with
the perceived discrimination in treatment between the Western Hemisphere nations and
the Asian nations in United States diplomacy.” Gaines, supra note 33, at 819. According
to Howse, that report “clarified” that there is no self-standing duty to negotiate. Howse,
supra note 26, at 509 n.39.
114 Gaines, supra note 33, at 819.
108
109
110
111
112
113
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energies” would “satisfy the implicit . . . general requirement . . .
that there must always be a good faith effort at negotiations
before invoking Article XX rights.”115 What standard would a
WTO panel apply in the absence of any discrimination among
exporting countries? If the Appellate Body has indeed imposed a
duty to negotiate on WTO members invoking Article XX(g), then
it has also saddled WTO panels with the difficult task of
developing an appropriate standard with little guidance on the
question: How much of a diplomatic effort must the importing
country make before resorting to unilateral import restrictions?
Howse infers from the Appellate Body’s silence on this question
that there is no such independent duty to negotiate before
invoking Article XX, arguing that had the Appellate Body
“intended to read into the chapeau a self-standing duty to
negotiate seriously, it would have given some guidance as to the
extent of the duty.”116
Most important, once we recall the Appellate Body’s focus on
the ordinary meaning of the text of Article XX, we cannot
reasonably read the Appellate Body’s rulings to impose a duty to
negotiate in the absence of any “discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail.”117 There is simply no basis
in the text of Article XX for any such duty. As Gaines observes,
“the text of Article XX makes no explicit reference to unilateral or
Indeed, “[n]othing in the lettered
multilateral action.”118
paragraphs or the chapeau constrains a member government’s
choice among multilateral, regional, bilateral, or unilateral
approaches.”119
The only provision in Article XX that the Appellate Body ever
identifies as imposing a duty to negotiate on the United States is
the chapeau language against “discrimination,” and as Gaines
115 Id.; see id. at 805 (noting that the 1998 Appellate Body report “sets no definable,
predictable standard for determining how much effort at negotiations will satisfy the
WTO”); Neuling, supra note 73, at 47 (noting that the 1998 Appellate Body report does
not address the question of “how much of a diplomatic effort must the importing nation
make?”).
116 Howse, supra note 26, at 508.
117 We should distinguish negotiations from those discussions that may be necessary
to avoid discrimination among countries with comparably effective conservation
programs. The Appellate Body required a country imposing an import ban to consider
whether the conservation policies of the exporting country are as effective as those of the
importing country. This requirement may entail some discussions between the importing
country and the exporting country but does not imply that the importing country must
negotiate a compromise with the exporting country over the appropriate level of
effectiveness for these conservation policies.
118 Gaines, supra note 33, at 807. “Nor does the language of Article XX offer any
basis from which to infer that multilateral action is a chapeau precondition for national
measures.” Id.
119 Id.
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notes, “[t]here is no inherent connection between unilateralism
and discrimination.”120 He complains that the Appellate Body
“articulates no historical foundation or legal basis for the
conclusion that failure to make bona fide efforts to negotiate a
treaty comes within the chapeau’s concept of ‘unjustifiable’
discrimination.”121 Thus, Gaines takes the Appellate Body to
task for imposing the “condition that unilateral measures under
Article XX can only be taken after serious efforts at multilateral
negotiations.”122
The ordinary meaning of the text of Article XX, however, is
not a reason to criticize the Appellate Body for imposing this
condition as much as it is a reason to reject the notion that the
Appellate Body ever imposed this condition at all. After all, as
Howse notes, the Appellate Body “never held that the
requirements of the chapeau, in and of themselves, impose a sui
generis duty to negotiate.”123 Given the lack of any textual basis
for such a duty, and in the absence of any explicit statement by
the Appellate Body imposing such a duty, we should not readily
infer such a duty from the Appellate Body’s rulings. This
supposed duty to negotiate is implausible as an interpretation of
the Appellate Body rulings precisely because it is implausible as
an interpretation of Article XX.
Knox points to paragraph 171 of the 1998 ruling, in which
the Appellate Body contrasts the multilateral “alternative course
of action” with “the unilateral and non-consensual procedures of
the import prohibition,” as support for a duty to negotiate before
imposing a unilateral import ban.124 If we read paragraph 171 as
a whole, however, and especially if we view it in context rather
than in isolation, we find that the Appellate Body points to this
multilateral alternative to underscore the feasibility of serious
negotiations with all affected parties rather than only some and
to demonstrate that this discrimination in diplomatic efforts was
“unjustifiable.”125 That is, the Appellate Body points to the InterAmerican Convention and this “cooperative” alternative only to
criticize the failure of the United States “to negotiate similar
agreements with any other country or group of countries.”126
Id. at 805.
Id.; see Simmons, supra note 30, at 444 (“[T]here is currently no mandate within
the GATT to engage in bilateral and multilateral negotiations prior to taking unilateral
actions.”).
122 Gaines, supra note 33, at 814.
123 Howse, supra note 26, at 507.
124 Knox, supra note 20, at 41 n.165.
125 See Howse, supra note 26, at 507-08. Paragraph 172 in particular is quite explicit
in relating “unilateralism” to the “unjustifiable nature of this discrimination” in
negotiating efforts. 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 172.
126 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 171.
120
121
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Knox concedes that the text of Article XX “provides no
apparent link” to “the principle of multilateralism.”127 Thus, he
can derive an independent duty to negotiate from the Appellate
Body opinions only by claiming that the Appellate Body “read the
chapeau as giving it broad powers to strike a balance, or find a
‘line of equilibrium,’ between trade and environmental
interests.”128 In support of this claim, he quotes paragraph 159 of
the 1998 Appellate Body ruling.129 This paragraph describes
“[t]he task of interpreting and applying the chapeau” as
“essentially the delicate one of locating and marking out a line of
equilibrium between the right of a [WTO] Member to invoke an
exception under Article XX and the rights of the other
Members.”130
This paragraph, however, does not suggest that the
Appellate Body has given itself broad powers to distort the
ordinary meaning of the text of the chapeau or to replace treaty
language with a balancing test. After all, the Appellate Body
describes itself as locating “a line of equilibrium” only in the
course of “interpreting and applying the chapeau.” Thus, the
quoted passage merely acknowledges that when the Appellate
Body interprets certain words in the chapeau, such as “arbitrary”
and “unjustifiable,” and applies them to specific facts, their
precise meaning will invariably be subject to dispute, because
reasonable minds can differ on the precise meaning of such
words. In choosing among different plausible interpretations of
127 Knox, supra note 20, at 56-57. He does suggest, however, that “relying on rigid
unilateral measures in the absence of attempts to find a multilateral solution to regional
or global environmental problems could be seen as unjustifiable discrimination against
other countries in favor of the country applying the trade restriction,” because “the failure
to take into account the views and interests of other affected countries could lead to a
presumption that the resulting unilateralism will unjustifiably discriminate against those
interests.” Id. at 65. If Knox uses the term “rigid” to refer to the inflexibility in
certification criteria that the 1998 Appellate Body ruling condemned, then an importing
country can avoid “unjustifiable discrimination” by eliminating this inflexibility, just as
the United States did with respect to section 609, rather than by attempting to negotiate
a multilateral agreement. If Knox has a broader notion of “rigid” in mind, on the other
hand, then his suggestion must deem countries with conservation policies that are not
comparably effective to be “countries where the same conditions prevail” in the sense
relevant under the chapeau. This interpretation of the chapeau, however, would give the
phrase “where the same conditions prevail” virtually no effect in restricting the type of
“discrimination” prohibited by the chapeau. Furthermore, this interpretation of “same
conditions” would seem to be at odds with the reasoning of the Appellate Body in the
shrimp-turtle rulings, which deems countries with conservation policies that are not
comparably effective to be different enough in a relevant respect to justify discrimination
between them. See, e.g., 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 121.
128 Knox, supra note 20, at 56.
129 Id. at 37.
130 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 159. Axel Bree also reads this language
as Knox does. See Bree, supra note 42, at 119 (“By introducing a balancing test . . ., the
Appellate Body has opened the door for arguments and requirements that do not
necessarily need to have a textual basis.”).
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those words, the Appellate Body will inevitably have to balance
the opposing interests at stake in deciding which interpretation
to adopt in resolving the dispute. The Appellate Body did not,
however, give itself license to invent requirements without any
basis in the text of the chapeau. Such an extraordinary reading
of paragraph 159 would be inconsistent with the Appellate Body’s
explicit focus on the ordinary meaning of the text of Article XX.
Thus, this paragraph does not support the duty to negotiate that
Knox seeks to derive from the shrimp-turtle rulings, and we are
left with the conclusion that neither the ordinary meaning of the
text of the chapeau nor the Appellate Body’s interpretation of the
chapeau imposes any such duty.
III. CONCLUSION
The Appellate Body’s rulings in the shrimp-turtle case
indicates that importing countries can defend environmental
trade measures, even unilateral import bans, under GATT
Article XX as long as they avoid unfair discrimination. These
unilateral trade measures may justifiably discriminate against
imports produced by processes that harm natural resources
located outside the jurisdiction of the importing countries or
against imports from countries that have environmental policies
deemed inadequate by the importing country.
The 2001
Appellate Body ruling, by emphasizing paragraph 121 from the
1998 Appellate Body ruling so forcefully, confirmed that WTO
members enjoy a right to restrict imports based on
environmental standards unilaterally prescribed by the
importing country and applied to the conservation policies of
exporting countries.
The case-by-case approach endorsed by the Appellate Body
should provide much broader leeway for the use of environmental
trade measures than suggested by past panel decisions. Under
the Article XX chapeau, an exporting country can challenge such
measures if they are applied in a manner that amounts to “a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries” or “a disguised restriction on international trade.”131
In particular, the Appellate Body held that to avoid “arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination,” the country imposing a ban on
imports from an exporting country must provide a formal hearing
that allows the exporting country to argue that it has comparable
environmental policies even if they are not precisely the same as
the policies in the importing country, make the same efforts to
negotiate with all exporting countries, make the same efforts to
131

GATT, supra note 2, art. XX, 61 Stat. pt. 5, at A60-61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
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transfer technology to all exporting countries, and provide a
formal notice of the reasons for adverse decisions and some
procedure for review of or appeal from these denials. By basing
its scrutiny of environmental trade measures only on
requirements that are explicit in the text of Article XX of the
GATT, the Appellate Body strikes a more reasonable balance
between environmental and trade interests than panels in prior
decisions have struck.
The Appellate Body can continue this progress by making
good on its promise to remain faithful to the ordinary meaning of
the text of GATT Article XX. By focusing on that text, we can
resolve many of the disagreements that have arisen regarding
the proper interpretation of the Appellate Body’s rulings in the
shrimp-turtle case. In particular, the ordinary meaning of that
text militates against any jurisdictional limitation on the
conservation exception in Article XX, against a requirement that
import bans based on the conservation policies of exporting
countries include shipment-by-shipment exceptions, and against
an independent duty for importing countries to open negotiations
with exporting countries before imposing an import ban.
Closer attention to the text of the GATT would not only
make for better legal reasoning but also give greater legitimacy
to WTO rulings. To impose restrictions on environmental trade
measures without a basis in the text of Article XX erodes respect
for the WTO in particular and undermines the political support
for free trade in general. In this sense, WTO rulings that are
more sensitive to environmental interests will also do a better job
of serving our interest in free trade as well.

